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Abstract
We develop a model to illustrate a motive for FDI that derives from a firm’s overall locational
strategy. A firm, that initially has a plant in its home country, may choose to also have a for-
eign plant in order to improve its bargaining position versus local labour unions. This permits
the firm to reduce wages. Furthermore, the existence of a second foreign plant acts to disci-
pline the demands of foreign workers. Thus, the firm is faced with a link between the wage and
its degree of geographical diversification. This drives up the number of plants the firm has in
equilibrium.
The study of foreign direct investment (FDI) has tended to focus upon two
reasons for locating in a particular country. First, firms are motivated by
the search for lower costs of supplying a market. Second, firms may wish to
gain improved access to that country’s or some other country’s market.1 If
attention is restricted to these two motives, then a firm that considers hav-
ing similar production facilities in more than one foreign country should be
regarded as facing a number of separate FDI decisions. Writers such as de
Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987) and Sung and Lapan (2000) have shown,
using models with location-specific uncertainty, how a firm’s FDI decisions
can instead be regarded as together determining that firm’s overall locational
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strategy. This alternative approach complements standard explanations of
FDI by highlighting a possible motive for FDI that derives from FDI’s role
in determining the geographical diversification of a firm. We show that even
without uncertainty, but in the presence of labour unions, there can be a
motive for FDI that derives from a firm’s overall locational strategy. Further-
more, such FDI acts to set up similar production capabilities in a number of
countries.
Briefly put, the idea is this: a firm may choose to have foreign production
in order to improve its bargaining position versus local labour unions, and so
secure lower wages than if they remained domestic. Furthermore, choosing to
have a plant in more than one foreign country may lower wages further. Thus,
the firm is faced with a potential link between the wage rate and its degree of
geographical diversification. Specifically, the greater is the firm’s geographical
diversification (i.e., the more countries in which it has a plant) the lower might
wages be.
Leading firms are typically highly geographically diversified. For example,
leading EU firms will most often have operations in more than two or three
EU countries. It is most relevant to focus upon within-industry geographical
diversification: if an EU-owned firm has a foreign plant in an EU country, in
how many other EU countries is the firm active in the same industry? A recent
study by Pavelin (2000) shows that leading EU firms are on average active in
three other EU countries.2 Indeed, a foreign plant in the larger EU countries,
such as UK, Germany and France, will on average be accompanied by simi-
lar operations by the same firm in four other EU countries; for the smaller EU
countries, such as Ireland, Portugal and Greece, the figure is around six. Such a
pattern of foreign production might arise from a succession of entirely separate
FDI decisions. Instead, we aim here to investigate one potential motive for FDI
that arises out of a firm’s desire to adopt its optimal degree of geographical
diversification.
The idea that a firm may, by being multinational, improve its bargaining po-
sition versus workers, is one that has been subject to informal discussion in
the theory of the multinational enterprise (see for example Cowling and Sugden
(1987)).3 It is argued that an MNE can use a threat to shift production away
from a particular site to influence its relations with unions in each country in
which it produces. This ensures that the unions compete among themselves
for employment within the firm. Such competition bids down wages below
those available to a uninational firm. The firm’s status as a multinational is
crucial, as it makes credible4 the threat to shift production away from each
country.
This informal story was brought within a formal framework by Huizinga (1990).
Huizinga provides a treatment that is explicitly concerned with geographical
diversification.5 He modelled a firm that must decide upon the number of ge-
ographically differentiated plants it will have. Each plant earns rents accord-
ing to the transport cost saving it offers the firm. These rents are then partially
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appropriated by a plant-specific union. Thus, the plant-specific rents and wages
are both decreasing in the number of plants. He shows that: if labour demand
at each plant is more elastic the greater is the number of plants, the wage will
be decreasing in the number of plants such that the firm will be motivated to
have more plants than is technologically efficient.6 Geographical diversification
is driven up by a desire to reduce wages.
Huizinga assumes that more plants means stronger competition between
unions for employment within the firm, as witnessed by more elastic labour
demand. This assumption ensures the firm will become more geographically
diversified than is technologically efficient. However, he does not model the
mechanism by which increased geographical diversification improves the bar-
gaining position of the firm. It is altogether possible that extra plants could
drive down plant-specific rents and wages in the same proportion. In that case,
wages would be set such that the firm would not drive up its profits by building
more plants than is technologically efficient.
By contrast, we treat the issue using a simple game-theoretic approach. We
present a model of a firm’s decision regarding the number of plants to have,
where competition between workers for employment within the firm is explicitly
described. Where the firm has more than one location, each plant-specific union
will set its wage bearing in mind that too high a wage will cause the firm to
produce elsewhere. We show that a firm that geographically diversifies can, by
doing so, drive down its production costs. This is because the diversification
brings international competition between labour unions.
The work of Horn and Wolinsky (1988) is related to our paper. Building on the
Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model they consider two groups of workers em-
ployed in a single firm. A major result in their paper is that if the two groups of
workers are sufficiently close substitutes it is an equilibrium that they unite in an
encompassing union. If they are complements then they are better able to ad-
vance their interests in separate unions. Horn and Wolinsky briefly discuss how
their results suggest an extension to an FDI setting. They mention the possible
incentive of firms to set up plants in different countries to weaken the bargaining
position of workers that cannot organise internationally. Skaksen and Sørensen
(2001) develop this and exploit the mechanisms in Horn and Wolinsky in a two
country, one firm FDI model. They find that if there is a high degree of comple-
mentarity between activities moved abroad and those remaining at home then
the workers in the home firm benefit from FDI. In our model, using the terminol-
ogy of Horn and Wolinsky, workers in the different plants of the multinational are
substitutes and hence their interests are radically opposed. We present a three
country model in which the motive for FDI is to weaken the power of unions. We
examine the link between this divide and rule motive for FDI and geographical
diversification of plant location and production. The main parameters we focus
upon are FDI costs, trade costs and the reservation wages of workers in different
locations.
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1. The model
There is one firm, a monopolist in the production of a single good. There are
three countries: A, B and C. Each country is a potential production location for
the firm, but only A hosts a market for the good. The market in A is such that
the inverse demand function is:
p = α − βq (1)
where q is the firm’s output. Initially, the firm has a plant in A, and must choose
whether or not to set up foreign plants in either B or C, or both.7 There is a fixed
cost of setting up a plant, G. Once plant-specific costs are sunk, technology is
such that the production of each unit requires one unit of labour. Thus, there is a
constant marginal cost equal to the wage rate. Any goods produced overseas
must be transported back to A to be brought to market. There is a constant
per-unit transport cost of t .
Plant-specific labour unions set wages. Thus, wages are set at the plant-level
by a different monopoly union at each plant. So, one assumption here is that
there is no international cooperation between unions.8 The reservation wage
(the minimum wage for which labour can be hired) differs between countries:
ωA in A, ωB in B, and ωC in C. We assume that the foreign countries offer lower
reservation wages than does A, i.e. ωA > ωB, ωC.
There is a three stage game as follows: in the first stage, the firm decides
whether to build a plant in B, C or both; in the second stage, local unions set
wages at each plant; in the third stage, the firm sets output at each plant. So,
foreign direct investment is taken to be fixed when unions set wages. It also
follows that both FDI and wages are taken to be fixed when the firm sets output.
It is worth making two further points before presenting results. These con-
cern the scope of the model. Firstly, the foreign production permitted is purely
vertical in nature: the firms’ foreign production is used only to serve the domes-
tic market. Thus, it is of the sort that replaces high cost domestic production
with low cost foreign production, without seeking to gain entry into the foreign
market, i.e., that typically associated with north-south or west-east FDI. In the
context of EU firms, prime examples would be their FDI into China and Eastern
Europe.
Secondly, despite the simple and abstract nature of this model, it is general in
one respect. The use of a three country world is not as restrictive as it may seem.
Given the other features of the model, only two foreign countries would ever
be important for the analysis—these being the two countries with the lowest
reservation wages. Thus, the model represents a case where there are at least
two foreign countries that offer lower reservation wages than the home country.
There may be more than two, but B and C are the two that offer the lowest.
The next section gives results. Some concluding remarks are provided in
Section 3.
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2. Results
The game is solved by working backwards. The equilibrium output level is de-
pendent upon wages and the firm’s FDI strategy. Irrespective of the number of
plants it has, the firm will chose to produce in only one location. This is because
each plant it has is capable of serving the entire market at constant returns to
scale. Thus, even if the firm has more than one plant, one of the plants will offer
the low cost method of serving the market. All production will take place at this
plant and the others will lie dormant. Output will be set at the monopoly level
given the marginal costs of production and transportation associated with the
working plant.
It would be somewhat unrealistic to assert that a dormant plant, or dormant
plants, characterise FDI. It reflects the simple and abstract nature of the model
we present. It would be more realistic to have a multi-plant firm produce in all
plants and shift production only partially to favour lower cost plants. Indeed, a
model made more sophisticated by the suitable introduction of geographically
differentiated products, or plant-level decreasing returns to scale, would give
more realistic outcomes of this type. However, such sophistication would leave
the central point of the paper, to illustrate FDI motivated by a desire to influence
wage-setting behaviour, unchanged.
The wage set by the union at each plant is determined by the reservation
wages in the countries where the firm has a plant, and the pattern of FDI. If the
firm remains uninational, the monopoly union sets the wage9 as follows:
wA = α + ωA2 (2)
where wA is the wage set by the union in A. If instead the firm has a foreign plant
in B, C or both, the unions compete to ensure that the firm produces at their
plant. They set wages at the highest level that will nonetheless attract produc-
tion, subject to the restriction that wages be no lower than the reservation wage.
The attractiveness of a foreign plant is handicapped by the costs of shipping
the goods back home. So to be successful, a foreign union must set a wage of
no more than the wage set in A less t . Similarly, the union at home must not set
a wage in excess of the sum of t and the lowest wage set abroad. In equilibrium
the unions will set wages as follows (where  is the small amount by which the
successful plant undercuts its nearest rival):
One foreign plant (in i = B or C)
wA = max(ωA, ωi + t − ) (3)
wi = max(ωi , ωA − t − ) (4)
Two foreign plants
wA = max(ωA, min(ωB + t − , ωC + t − )) (5)
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wB = max(ωB, min(ωA − t − , ωC − )) (6)
wC = max(ωC, min(ωA − t − , ωB − )). (7)
This brings us to the FDI choice. There are four possible configurations of
FDI: no FDI, FDI in only B, FDI in only C, FDI in B and C. These will be re-
ferred to as OO, FO, OF and FF, respectively. The location of production will
be indicated by a subscript, e.g., OOA refers to domestic production by a uni-
national firm; OFC is foreign production located in a plant in C; FFB refers to a
three-country firm that produces in B. We will present the range of equilibrium
outcomes graphically. First, by way of introduction, consider three exhaustive
cases: (i) ωA is below ωB + t and ωC + t ; (ii) ωA − t lies between the reservation
wages in the foreign countries; and (iii) in which ωA is above ωB + t and ωC + t .
Without loss of generality, let us assume for the moment that ωB < ωC.
In case (i), production will take place in A even if there is FDI. This is because
workers in A will, if faced with competition from abroad, offer the lowest marginal
cost of serving the market: ωB + t − . Thus, the firm faces the following choice:
remain domestic and so pay a monopoly wage; or set up a plant in B and
so introduce the international competition between workers that drives down
domestic wages. Note that there is no incentive to set up a second foreign
plant. The three-plant firm would still produce in A, where wages would be set
to undercut the lowest cost foreign plant. So, building a plant in the foreign
country with the lowest reservation wage succeeds in reducing the domestic
wage to the lowest level available to the firm. Therefore, the relevant choice for
the firm is between OOA and FOA, and depends upon the size of the cost of
FDI, G.
In case (ii), as in case (i), there will be FDI in one country at most. If there is
FDI into country B then production will take place there and the marginal cost
of serving the domestic market will be ωA − , as wB = ωA − t − . The firm faces
a choice between OOA and FOB.
Finally, in case (iii) the firm may choose to build two foreign plants. With
plants in only A and B production takes place in B at wages determined by the
reservation level in A (ωA − t − ). However, with three plants production again
takes place abroad, but at a lower wage: one determined by the reservation
wage in C (ωC − ). The firm must choose between OOA, FFB and FOB or OFC.
It is worth noting that if the firm opts for two plants it is indifferent between B
and C as a destination for its FDI. The explanation for this somewhat surprising
result is that regardless of which foreign location the firm chooses, production
takes place at that location, at a wage equal to ωA − t − .10
The results are presented for four different levels of the plant-specific cost,
G.11 At higher levels of G, FDI is less attractive as the fixed cost of a foreign
plant is greater. So, we expect and see more widespread FDI as we move from
Figure 1, through 2 and 3, to Figure 4. To aid understanding of the figures we
will describe the key features of one of them. The workings of the other figures
should then be clear. We will focus on Figure 4 in which the FDI cost is very low
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and FDI will occur in all the areas of the figure. Consider first the two regions
marked ‘OFA’ and ‘FOA’ in the north east of the figure, where both ωB and ωC
are above ωA − t . Here the firm invests in one country: in B when ωB < ωC (to the
left of the diagonal line); in C when ωC < ωB. In either case, the firm produces
in A. The wage in A is set so that wA − t marginally undercuts the reservation
wage of the country they invest in. In the area marked ‘OFC’ ωC is low but ωB
is high (ωC < ωA − t < ωB). In this region the firm simply invests and produces
in C at a wage wC = ωA − t − . The area marked ‘FOB’ is the mirror image of
the OFC region. In ‘FOB’, a low reservation wage in B brings investment, and
production, in B. Next consider the central region marked ‘FOB or OFC’. Here
both ωB and ωC are lower than ωA − t . In this region, as explained earlier, the
firm is indifferent between investment in B or C because regardless of which
foreign location the firm chooses, production takes place at that location, at
a wage equal to ωA − t − . In this region the firm is not concerned about the
ranking of ωB and ωC, only that they are lower than ωA − t . In the regions marked
‘FFB’ and ‘FFB’ both foreign reservation wages are low enough for the firm to
find it optimal to set up a plant in both foreign locations. It will then produce in
the lower reservation wage country at a wage set just below that in the higher
reservation foreign country. Thus in the south west of Figure 4 we have two
regions separated by the diagonal line. Above the diagonal, we have ωC < ωB
and so production occurs in C; below the diagonal, production is in B.
Also looking at Figures 1 to 4, note that in each of the figures, FDI is more
advantageous close to the axes, as this is where overseas reservation wages
are at their lowest. Indeed, this is reflected in the results, where in Figure 2,
non-FDI outcomes are restricted to only the north-east corner of the diagram.
The crucial features of these results for our purposes relate to the motive for
FDI that is derived from the firm’s ability to influence wage-setting. It is upon
this that we will focus our attention.
2.1. The link between geographical diversification and wages
The firm can, by building a foreign plant, drive down the wage set by the union in
its home country. The existence of a foreign plant acts to discipline the demands
of domestic workers. In the absence of a foreign plant, the domestic union would
set a monopoly wage; if it faces an MNE it sets a wage at the home reservation
wage or slightly below the cost of serving the market from abroad. So, if at least
one of the foreign countries offer a low cost environment, and G is sufficiently
low, the firm will build a foreign plant in order to lower wages. Indeed, the firm
may even continue to produce at home (this is OFA and FOA in Figures 2, 3 and
4). In this case, the only role of the foreign plant is to bid down domestic wages.
Similarly, by building two foreign plants (this is FFB and FFC in Figure 4), the
firm can drive down the wage set by foreign unions. In this case, the existence
of a second foreign plant acts to discipline the demands of foreign workers.
In the absence of a second foreign plant, a foreign union would set a wage so
370 LEAHY AND PAVELIN
as to slightly undercut the firm’s costs at home; if two foreign unions compete,
they set wages to undercut each other. So, if both foreign countries offer a low
cost environment, and G is sufficiently low, the firm will build two foreign plants
in order to lower wages. The firm will only produce in one of them, the role of
the other foreign plant is to bid down the wages set at the working plant.
2.2. Comparisons with a base case
The set of diagrams given above show not only the equilibrium outcomes in
the full model, but also those for a restricted model: one where the wage in
each country is set at the reservation wage. This restriction is imposed in order
to show a pattern in FDI that occurs when there is no link between the firm’s
geographical diversification and wage-setting behaviour in each country. In the
base case, wages are set in each location at the reservation wage. Thus a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for FDI is that the reservation wage at
the foreign location be strictly less than wA − t . The firm faces a standard FDI
trade-off between lower variable costs and higher fixed costs—undertaking
FDI only if the foreign wage represents a saving that is sufficient to recoup
the cost of the plant. Figures 5 to 8 facilitate comparisons between the base
case and the full model at the same levels of G. The range of G of Figure 8
corresponds to that of Figure 4, while that of Figure 7 corresponds to that of
Figure 3, etc. Again, to aid understanding of the figures, we will describe one
of them (Figure 8) in detail and show how it differs from the corresponding
figure for the full model (Figure 4). In Figure 8, OOA (no FDI) occurs at all foreign
reservation wages above wA − t , and even some below. In contrast, in Figure 4
there is FDI at some foreign reservation wages above wA − t . This is because, in
the full model, the firm can lower the wage it faces at home by engaging in FDI
to generate competition between unions. Figure 4 also shows the firm making
investments into both B and C that together engender competition between
the foreign unions. However, in Figure 8 there is FDI into at most one foreign
country, because in the base case there is no strategic advantage to the firm
in holding excess capacity. This and other pairwise comparisons of the figures
reveal that, at the same level of G, FDI is more widespread in the full model.
This is perhaps a little surprising because marginal costs are weakly lower
in the base case; reservation wages are, by definition, the lowest labour costs
that the firm can face in each country. The incentive to undertake FDI is greater
the lower are variable costs. This is because lower variable costs mean a larger
output, and FDI involves a fixed cost (G) in exchange for a per-unit saving (the
wage differential minus t ). So from this, one would expect a greater prevalence
of FDI in the base case. However, there is more FDI in the full model. This is
because the motive for FDI that the firm derives from its ability to influence
wage-setting outweighs the weakly higher wages it faces in all countries in the
full model.
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Figures 1–8. At each level of G, there is more FDI when wages are set by unions. (In the figures
the upper bound on ωB and ωC is at ωA; and in Figures 2–4 the intermediate level ωA − t is the upper
bound on the region marked ‘FOB or OFC).
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2.3. Trade liberalisation
It is interesting to consider the relationship between trade liberalisation and FDI
in our model. Lower trade costs (t) harden the wage competition that the do-
mestic union faces if the firm has a foreign plant, which increases the incentive
to engage in FDI. Consider the choice between not investing (OOA) and invest-
ing in one foreign country while continuing to produce at home (FOA or OFA). In
OOA production costs are of course independent of t. If the firm were instead to
choose FOA (OFA), the marginal cost would be wA = ωB − + t (wA = ωC − + t),
which depends positively on t. Hence a fall in trade costs increases the incentive
to engage in this form of strategic FDI.
It is also the case that a reduction in trade costs increases the incentive
to produce in foreign plants. When a firm has one foreign plant, for instance
in B, the marginal cost of supplying the home market is max(ωB + t − , ωA)
were it served from the home plant, and max(ωA − , ωB + t ) were it served
from abroad. Thus the lower is t , the more likely it is that the marginal cost
at home is ωA. If this is the case, the foreign plant offers the lowest cost
method of serving the market (ωA − ε), and production will be located
there.
Next consider the impact of trade liberalisation on the choice between invest-
ing in one location versus investing in two locations, e.g., FOB versus FFB. At
FOB, the cost of serving the home market is independent of t as it is determined
by the reservation wage in the home country (as wB + t = ωA − ε). However, in
the FFB regime the cost of serving the domestic market is increasing in t (as
wB + t = ωC + t − ε). Hence, a fall in trade costs increases the incentive to set
up two plants.
3. Conclusion
This simple model is a formal illustration of an idea that is likely to be familiar
to the reader: firms can improve their bargaining position versus local labour
unions by being multinational. We show a mechanism by which a link between
geographical diversification and wage-setting can exist. Furthermore, we show
the effect of such a link on the FDI behaviour of a firm: FDI is made more
widespread. This is because having one foreign plant may drive down wages,
and having two may drive them down further still.
We assumed throughout that unions could not cooperate internationally. The
absence of international cooperation was taken as a stylised fact. While cultural
and linguistic impediments to international cooperation have proved, and con-
tinue to prove, prohibitive, deepening globalisation of the business environment
may facilitate international relationships of this kind. If such cooperation were
to occur, it would act to frustrate attempts, on the part of global business, to
divide and rule.
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Notes
1. Buckley and Casson (1981) specify the optimal timing of FDI for a single firm by reference
to costs, demands and market growth. The relationship between production costs, market
access and strategic behaviour in determining FDI is modelled by Smith (1987), Horstman and
Markusen (1987) and (1992) and by Motta (1992). Caves (1996) presents an excellent discussion
of such standard explanations of multinational enterprises and FDI.
2. Pavelin uses the NACE three-digit classification to define industries.
3. Somewhat related to this is the advantage to a firm of commitment to investment before unions
choose wages. Van der Ploeg (1987) shows that such commitment can reduce the ability of
unions to extract rent. For a review of how the theory of the MNE has addressed these issues,
see Caves (1996).
4. It is made credible in that such a multi-plant firm can reduce its production at one location
while maintaining overall output, and without incurring the large fixed costs of building a new
plant. It can do so by increasing production at its other plant or plants. They can, of course,
only do so if there is initially sufficient excess capacity at the alternative site(s). The implicit
assumption is that workers will only believe that production may be allocated elsewhere once
capacity exists elsewhere.
5. There is also a growing literature on wage bargaining and FDI that is not concerned with
geographical diversification. See for instance, Naylor and Santoni (2003) and Zhao (1998).
6. He defines the technologically efficient number of plants as that which the firm would choose
to have given a non-unionised workforce. If workers do not bargain collectively, the firm will
not reduce wages by increasing the number of plants. This is because the workers would not
receive a wage determined by rents accrued at each plant.
7. The firm will wish to have at most one plant in any country. This is because each plant offers
enough capacity to serve the entire market, and because there is only one union in each country.
Indeed, it is worth noting that in this model a country can therefore be interpreted as a region
defined as the geographical influence of a union.
8. We assume that workers cannot organise internationally and that unions cannot cooperate
across national boundaries. There are cultural and linguistic reasons why unionisation is more
difficult across, rather than within, national boundaries. If, in our model, international coopera-
tion between unions were possible, geographical diversification of the firm would not achieve
wage competition among its workers. For example, if one were to assume that side payments
between unions were infeasible, and that the firm would, if all plants offered them the same cost
of supplying the market, share production evenly between them, then international coopera-
tion between unions would ensure that such international cost parity exists. A forward-looking
firm would anticipate this and realise that opening extra plants would fail to introduce wage
competition.
9. Here, the monopoly union unilaterally sets the wage so as to maximise labour rents subject to
the firm’s labour demand curve q = (α − w)/2β. Extension to a Nash bargaining set-up would
complicate the algebra without making any qualitative difference to the results. This is to say,
it would not remove the potential for the type of motive for FDI that is the central focus of the
paper. However, this is not to say that a change in the bargaining power of unions would have
no effect on outcomes. If the bargaining power of the union in country A were reduced for
any reason, perhaps through legislation, this would tend to depress both the wage set in A in
the absence of FDI, and the firm’s incentive to engage in FDI. Hence, there is a role for labour
market policy in the ‘anchorage’ of domestic firms and jobs
10. It should be noted that the foreign unions are not indifferent between the two possible loca-
tions for FDI, as each would strictly prefer the firm to invest in their country. In particular, the
foreign union with the lowest reservation wage would like, in order to secure inward invest-
ment, to offer a lower wage than the other. They do not do so because they cannot, in our
model, credibly commit to such a wage prior to the firm’s location decision. Once FDI has been
carried out, the foreign union has an incentive to offer the lowest possible wage reduction that
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nevertheless undercuts the home union. It is the firm’s anticipation of such an incentive that
makes it indifferent between investing in B and C.
11. The four ranges of G allow us to depict all the qualitatively different cases. They are chosen as
follows: In Figure 1, G is so high that it is never profitable to build a foreign plant. In Figure 2,
G is high enough to ensure that it is optimal for the firm to do no FDI at some, but not all, ωB,
ωC < ωA. It is also too high for the firm to find it optimal ever to open two plants In Figure 3,
the G is still too high to justify three plants, but low enough to ensure FDI into one location at
all ωB, ωC < ωA. In Figure 4, G is so small that investment in two plants will occur provided ωB
and ωC are sufficiently low. Figures 5–8 show representative equilibrium outcomes for the base
case using the same ranges of G as in the Figures 1–4. Thus the G in Figure 5 is same as that
in Figure 1 and the G in Figure 6 is the same as that in Gigure 2 and so on for Figures 7 and 8.
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